• Step 1 -- Previous court decisions have concluded that the defamation law of Illinois is neither vague nor overly broad.
   
• Step 2 -- This is the heart of the matter.  Using the precedent case of Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 1942, we must determine whether the editorial is "worthwhile" or "worthless speech"   Was the language in the Atlas-Review's editorial defamatory, one of the types of speech defined in Chaplinsky as not deserving first amendment protection.  If so, it is "worthless speech"  and the Atlas-Review can be punished for defamation.  If not then it is protected speech and the A-R cannot be punished.  The only reason for rendering a decision here is to apply the standards for testing defamation.  Thus, decision two involves moving down to "worthless" speech.
   
• Step 3 -- There are two issues under appeal, each of which helps determine whether or not the editorial is defamatory. 
  
  First, could the A-R's failure to prove that their statements were true be held against the paper as the trial court had stated?  Even if Wallace is considered a private citizen, under Philadelphia Newspapers v Hepps, 1986, it is the obligation of the plaintiff (Wallace) suing a media defendant to show the statements are false.  The A-R has no obligation to prove truth.  Thus, under this precedent the court would find in favor of the A-R. 
  
  Second, if Wallace is considered a public figure, under Times v Sullivan, 1964 and Gertz v Welch, 1974, she would have had to show "actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth" by the  A-R, which she had not done according to the trial court.  That would also be grounds to find in favor of the A-R. 
  Was Wallace a public figure?  This decision could go either way with proper explanation since the Gertz case is somewhat vague as to what actions make one a public figure.  I use Curtis Publishing v Butts, (but you could logically cite any of several cases in Tedford pp. 91-92) because Wallace held a significant decision-making office in the community that affected others and because she thrust herself into the public debate by making calls to radio talk shows.  Thus, I conclude she is a public figure.
   
• Thus, whether or not Wallace is a public figure or a private person, she didn't meet the requirements to sustain a defamation conviction. She needed to show either that the charges were false or that there was malice.  She did neither.  Therefore, the defamation judgment against the Atlas-Review is overturned.

Janet West v. Warren Township Park Board

• Step 1 -- The ordinance is not vague but it is overbroad as it gives the complete power to regulate any activity, including protected speech activities, to a government agency - the Park Board.  The law goes beyond necessary regulation for the benefit of all and gives absolute power to a government agency to prohibit speech activities, power that exceeds what is necessary to regulate the park.   Ever since Hague v CIO, 1939 the USSC has recognized that public parks must be open for the purposes of "assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens and discussing public questions."  Thus, a decision to find the law "overbroad" is probably appropriate (although a good argument that it is not overbroad could be acceptable if well explained).
   
• Step 2 -- The rally in question is certainly "worthwhile speech" since it deals with matters of clear public concern, particularly state helmet laws.  Nothing in this case refers to any of the categories under Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 1942, that allow for considering the event "worthless" speech.  (No fighting words are mentioned nor has defamation or obscenity been charged.)  Thus, at most the event can be regulated, but it does fall in the category of speech worthy of protection.
   
• Step 3 -- This is a "time-manner-place" kind of case.  The appropriate level one test is balancing specific government interests (maintaining the park) versus the free speech rights of the motor cycle "club." While a number of cases (mentioned in Tedford pp. 266-272) could be cited with proper explanations, The most appropriate precedent case for this issue is P.E.A. v P.L.E.A., 1983 in which the SCOTUS establishes a three part analysis that indicates quintessential public forums like parks must be generally open to assembly and debate.  Thus, regardless of their suspicions or their dislike of the motorcycle club, the Park Board should have issued the permit (and required the damage deposit, cleanup, etc. to protect the public usefulness of the park) as they have with other groups. 
  
  The appellate court should now issue an order requiring the the Park Board to issue the permit. for the rally and picnic.
   
• Under Poulos v New Hampshire, 1953,  West had a duty to obey the Park Board's refusal to issue a permit since the Park Board could legally regulate use of the park IF they did so in a non-discriminatory way (even if in this case they did unfairly discriminate against the club.  (This decision could go either way with appropriate explanation, e.g. citing Lovell v Griffin, 1938). 
  
  Therefore West's conviction and fine are upheld.