Monmouth College
Department of History 

INTERVIEW WITH GRANT ANDRESEN 

Conducted in the fall of 2001 by Jeremy Roush, Monmouth College '01 

Roush: Where you were born?

Andresen: I was born in 1939 in Clinton County, Iowa, which is a country that butts up against the Mississippi River. I lived there for the first part of my life, through my high school years until I went away to school. 

Roush: Where did you go to school?

Andresen: I did my undergraduate work at Augustana College in Rock Island, Illinois.   I did my post-graduate work with the University of Iowa where I received my master’s degree, and did subsequent work at several universities.

Roush: What was your college major?

Andresen: My college major was History.

Roush: Where have you worked since graduating from college and graduate school?

Andresen: In education, which is what I was trained to do. I worked at Manulus High School before coming to Bureau Valley High School after the consolidation some six years ago.

Roush: While you were in high school and college, how much did you really care about the Vietnam War and our involvement in it?

Andresen: Well, of course from an observer’s point of view, when I was in high school, there was really no Vietnam war that involved us.  However, as high school students, we heard about the French trying to maintain their colonial empire, which included what they called Indochina, which we now call Vietnam.  I think those of us who were in high school in those days remember Dien Bien Phu and the subsequent aid which we gave to those people in South Vietnam whom we thought were anti-communist, as opposed to the communists in the North. But as far as our involvement was concerned, I don’t think that we thought of it as involvement. We knew that there were American advisors there but most of us felt through 1963 that they were simply advisors. We had advisers almost everywhere around the world where we thought the West was threatened by the approach of communism so I don’t think that, at that early date, most people looked upon it as what we later thought of as the Vietnam war.

Roush: What were some of the things that you were commonly hearing?

Andresen: Well, up until the real escalation of the fighting in 1964 and 1965, if you paid attention to foreign affairs, there was a growing concern that we would become too involved in those areas. That was it. But the concern grew. I know that I began reading about numbers [of advisors sent to Vietnam] increasing and with each increasing number, there were people who said don’t get involved in a ground war in Asia. That was not the thing to do. And we were reassured many times that it wasn’t going to be that and that we were simply doing in Vietnam what we had done in other places to assure what the government was calling “democratic governments.”  We were told that we were holding the line against communist expansion.  Everyone believed in then what was called the domino theory, which meant that if one country went over to communism, the next one was sure to fall.  Maybe someday we would have to stop them on the Mississippi River or some other place. 

Roush: When you heard all these things, did you support the war or were you against it at that time?

Andresen: Well, I don’t think it was a question that we could confront at that early point in time, because no one really seemed against sending military advisors to these places to help people who we thought wanted our help against the communists.  I would say probably, as much as I knew about the policy and remember, I don’t think many people had access to a lot of knowledge about what was going on there. But I would suspect that at that point of my life, I probably supported the idea of U.S. military advisors to counteract military action by the Communists.

Roush: Now that you look about today, are your views about the Vietnam War still the same or have they changed?

Andresen: Well they certainly are different from the way I looked at Vietnam in the late 1950s and early 1960s because of course the magnitude and commitment that was achieved. I don’t know of anybody who thinks the amount of lives that were lost was justified by the goals that were set.  Hindsight is always easier.  We take a look at what is happening now and perhaps starting some sort of agreement with the Vietnamese, so far as a trade and maybe someday even bases in the Far East…it is a great deal different than what we thought possible fifteen to twenty years ago. So I think that our views change over time as our perspective changes.

Roush: Had you seen at that time any demonstrations against U.S. involvement in Vietnam, or taken part in any of them?

Andresen: No, by the time the war was at the stage where people were protesting, I was teaching high school.  Our students, before the draft started pulling people over to Vietnam, were not real interested in it. Occasionally, we would see film clips on the TV news of protests in some universities and even at a couple of local colleges by about 1964 or 1965.   We saw some protest, but not much. The first time that I really saw an anti-war sentiment that developed into a demonstration or even a riot happened when I took a government class to see a rally for George Wallace and Curtis LeMay, who were campaigning for the presidency in 1968.  They were running on a third party ticket.  In the middle of the rally, a group of men stood up and started to heckle Wallace about the war.  Physical violence broke out but was contained inside.  But when we got outside the building, I was very nervous because I had high school students, juniors and seniors, with me and there was tear gas everywhere and police were carrying the shields, and the protesters and people were really becoming violent outside. I think that gave us a little view of what had happened in society, of how polarized we had become. I think that the things that Wallace and LeMay were saying appealed to the people on the right who wanted to support the war to an even greater degree than was happening at that time.  So I think that we became aware of it, whether through the media or through personal experiences.  It was becoming very difficult to get away from that issue by the time the mid 1960s rolled around.

Roush: Did you see many students getting drafted?

Andresen: Oh yes. By the time the mid and late `60s arrived.  Every spring graduation tended normally to be a time of happiness with a feeling of accomplishment. But as the number of draftees increased and the number of people going to Vietnam increased, I suppose a certain sense of foreboding affected those people who were graduating. It gave another dimension to what graduation meant.  A bit of danger involved, and the idea of not knowing what would happen to you afterwards--it was somewhat sinister when looking at the horizon.

Roush: Did you see more of your graduates going off to college because of they were trying to get out of the draft?

Andresen: I don’t think I ever saw that, not really.  A lot of people, as I talked to them about their choices, were kind of resolved.  They felt that the war was something that was just going to happen to them.  Many of their fathers had gone through WWII and it was not something that they wanted to do, but they felt that it was their duty in many cases. They didn’t look into the future with a lot of happiness about going to Vietnam, but felt that it was something they had to do. 

Roush: How many in your area do you think went over?

Andresen: Oh, that is difficult to say knowing that our graduating classes were very small--usually about thirty or thirty-five kids. Over a seven or eight year period, I would guess thirty to forty served in Vietnam.

Roush: Do you know whether any of them were killed?

Andresen: Oh yes, it was very sad news when bodies came home.   Most of us have extended relationships and I know that in my family, a number of people lost their lives, and friends from my boyhood, and college classmates. So it was very difficult because you couldn’t escape the reality and you couldn’t escape the pain.  That is what happened.  The involvement became so vast and widespread. The war came home much more quickly that it had two or three years prior.

Roush: What did you think about the destruction that the weapons caused?

Andresen:  We were looking at weapons of war whose side affects weren’t known. The side effects come afterwards. But people were using farm chemical in those days with side effects that we were really ignorant about--we were using DDT in those days.  But I think that is a tough question to answer.  I don’t think anyone was really aware of the negatives that something like Agent Orange would have on the environment and the long-lasting effects [on humans]. But there were people who were saying that the damage was too widespread and were opposed to the heavily concentrated bombing that we were doing on civilians in North Vietnam. We heard people complain about that.

Roush: What affect did the war have on you personally?

Andresen: Any time you lose not only acquaintances, but also friends and family in a conflict, you are never the same.  I won’t say it changes your opinion of the conflict but you become aware of the disasters that are occurring. On a personal level, I thought for certain that I would be drafted.  I had volunteered for armed services prior to the war and prior to the time I had started teaching and had been rejected because of what I considered were minor physical problems that happened when I was a kid.  Once the war started, they began looking for more people and my draft status was changed a couple of times, but I never received the call. Of course, because I was a teacher, I was draft exempt.

Roush: Were you ready to go if you drafted?

Andresen: Yeah, I probably would have gone. That doesn’t mean that I agreed with the war, but as far as I was concerned--and I am not being critical of those who went to Canada, that was their choice—but I think the draft was the thing to do because as the government tries to sort out a situation like that it needs people, it needs numbers. If I hadn’t gone, someone else would have gone. If you are a teacher, you don’t want to see some of your students go because you didn’t.  But I was never confronted, and I never had to make that decision.

Roush: What were some of your thoughts about Vietnam and what it be like over there?

Andresen: I am not totally unfamiliar with the climate and the situation. I had an older brother who had fought in the Far East in WWII. So I think that I was really conscious about the kinds of problems that are involved when fighting in those kinds of areas as far as the weather is concerned, the damage that it does to machines, and the guerilla warfare and how difficult it is for a country like the United States to fight that kind of a war. Yeah, I think I understand. I mean no one can fully understand unless you were there, but I think that I could have handled it.

Roush: How did the war years change your community?

Andreson: I think that our little community here, more than anything else, was saddened. I don’t think that the community was ever split. There was not a lot of talk about whether we support the war or we don’t. I never heard much of it. What I heard was that shame that our young men had to go over there and fight, but that probably it was necessary. We may not have all shared the idea that it was necessary but I think people may be almost comforted by the sounds of that. Maybe the alternative to saying it was necessary was saying that our government had made a poor mistake--and a lot of people, especially those who had gone through WWII and Korea--didn’t want to say that. It is not a comforting thing that you can’t trust your government. This is not an area where people readily admit to that. Maybe today it is, but certainly not in the `60s.

Roush: Do you think the war could have been prevented had there been more advisors and had the U.S. learned more about the geography and culture of Vietnam?

Andreson: Well, I think that it would have helped to be more aware that the situation was much more complex than we had imagined. It wasn’t just Communist against non-Communist.  Whether or not more advisors could have prevented war or whether or not we would have agreed to the North Vietnamese government taking over the South, I don’t know. Given the times, I doubt it, because this domino theory to many people was a very real thing. The idea that we should give up the South to the North meant to many people that Communist China and Russia would then move into the area and we would suffer another defeat that would shrink the world of democracy and enlarge the world of Communism.  I don’t that people, not knowing what the outcome of the war would be, would have agreed to that prior to U.S. involvement. I think by the time we were bogged down by the war, there were some people who were willing to consider those ideas, but I don’t think that in 1964, or ‘65, or 6’6 there were.

Roush: Are there any other aspects of the war that you think the U.S. could have improved on?

Andreson: Oh, that is very difficult to say. I think that we made too much of an enemy of Ho Chi Minh in the very beginning. I think that was maybe our greatest error--not trying to work with Ho Chi Minh to come up with some sort of a….well, maybe you couldn’t compromise, I don’t know, but insisting that the government of South Vietnam was the answer may have been an  incorrect move.

Roush: Do you think we should have fought harder in the war?

Andreson: Are you asking me if we should have nuked them? Then you would violate the sovereignty of other nations who border the area and I think that when you do that, you violate international rules. And after all, isn’t that what we were there for--to prevent the communists from violating international rules?  I don’t know how you win the objectives of the war when you do that. The United States perceives itself to be a very moral country. And I think, by and large, it has been. And for us to openly advocate breaking the rules would take away any idea of victory in this case. Obviously, we could have nuked them and wipe them off the face of the Earth and that would have won the war in many people’s eyes—but those aren’t the kinds of international objectives or even domestic objectives that we want. We don’t want to destroy everything in the name of victory.  I guess it is the same as saying if you blow up the fields, you won’t lose the football game and I suppose that is true but you won’t have any fields to play on either. I don’t go along with those who advocate the idea that our hands were tied. I think that they may have been exaggerating. Our hands weren’t tied in other ways. Our bombing was very heavy. I don’t think we understood who we were fighting against and what they were fighting for. I think that was a big problem too. Once you get involved in this thing, then you have to go for the win. And perhaps that is what impelled our military and people like Lyndon Johnson who was once quoted as saying “I don’t want to be the first president in American history to go down as losing a war.”  I think that many American people felt that way. We don’t want to think that we lost a war.

Roush: You don’t think that we should have gotten very heavily involved early on by bringing in the heavy artillery right away instead of just trying to go in and picking little battles out in the middle of nowhere?

Andreson:  We thought that American advisors helping the South Vietnamese would give them a tremendous advantage. Well, it apparently did not. We thought that by introducing weapons that we thought were better than anything that the North Vietnamese had would turn them around, but it didn’t. The answer is not the kind of technology we were using but in fact the people who were conducting the war on our side did not seem to have the same desire to win as the Vietnamese did. I think that was the telling point, not the kind of weaponry used because obviously we did massive saturation bombings and the North Vietnamese basically had no air force to speak of.  And we bombed totally in an unrestricted manner. I don’t know how much more of an advantage you can have than that. I am not sure that we didn’t use overwhelming firepower.

Roush: Are you glad that we got involved to try to stop it or do you wish that we never got involved in it?

Andreson: Well, I can’t say that we should have never gotten involved. I think that we had made a commitment to countries that opposed communism around the world. However, I would have certainly backed away from committing what we did for the cause that we did. But that is hindsight; that is easy to say now. At the time--and of course we are talking about different periods of the war too--I think it would have been much easier certainly if Eisenhower would have never committed any troops to help shore up the regime in the South. Maybe we should have allowed free elections, early on, which we did not.  I think that if we had done so, Ho Chi Minh probably would have an elected president of all Vietnam and the war would have never happened. But we thought we did not want a communist president for the whole area of Vietnam. But then we would have been confronted with another problem.  I can’t say that we did a good job with the war but early on, we were trying to face up to our commitment. There is talk of course now that if [President] John Kennedy had not been assassinated, he would have withdrawn the troops. I don’t know if that is true or not but we were not in any mood to retreat.  Once we got troops there, I don’t think it was a case of doing what Vietnam needed, it was the case of the U.S. saving face.  And that maybe was a mistake, but it was a hard mistake to admit.

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