Freedom of Expression and Communication Ethics

Dr. Lee McGaan  

  Office:  WH 308  (ph. 309-457-2155);  email lee@monmouthcollege.edu
  Home:  418 North Sunny Lane (ph. 309-734-5431, cell 309-333-5447)

Fall 2016 Office Hours:   MWF:  9:30 - 10am, 11am - Noon & 1 -2pm TTh:  2-3pm & by apt.  |  copyright (c) by Lee McGaan, 2006-2016


 Prior Restraint

I.  Prior Restraint stopping a message BEFORE it is communicated v ex post facto punishment

 

A.       Near v Minnesota (1931) Saturday Press published anti-Semitic and corruption charges against police officials.

1.        MN Supreme Court prohibited further publication of SP under MN law

2.        SCOTUS overturned prior restraint as violation of constitution except in rare situations.

3.        proper course of action says SCOTUS, is use defamation law after the fact.

a.          MN law is not aimed at redress of defamation

b.          The case involves public figures

c.           Prior restraint is not punishment but suppression

d.          Acceptable prior restraint could include:

 national security, public decency, incitement to violence.

 

B.       Lovell v Griffith (1938) A Jehovah Witness convicted of distributing religious leaflets on the street without a permit.  SCOTUS overturns the conviction

1.        The law is overbroad, as it restricts all literature (not just as in A.3.d. above)

2.        The law is invalid on its face for prior restraint by the license requirement

3.        In Schneider v State (1938) preventing litter is not sufficient government interest for prior restraint. Post facto punishment for littering is better.

 

C.      Mills v Alabama (1966) - A state can't prohibit Election Day editorials on grounds of “no ability to reply.”

 

D.      Bantam Books v Sullivan – a state commission cannot “pressure” publishers to drop “objectionable” books from distribution, esp. in the absence of judicial standards.

 

E.       Pittsburg Press v Pittsburg Commission on Human Relations (1973). The city can prohibit sex specific job ads because such ads are in furtherance of an illegal act (not prior restraint) and because it involves commercial speech, which is not as important to 1A concerns.

 

F.       Cox Broadcasting v Cohn (1975) - The law can't restrict publishing names of crime victims whose names are in public records.

 

G.      Film (Mutual Film v Ohio (1915) - Film is business not speech, press or “organs of public opinions.”)

1.        Burstyn v Wilson, (1952) reversed Mutual Film and gave film 1A protection

2.        Freedman v Maryland (1965) made censorship boards show:

a.        Burden of proof rests on censors to show that that the restricted film should be unprotected

b.        Decision time must be quick

c.        Judicial review must be allowed
 

H.         Issues of Decency

1.        Public nuisance statutes can't be used to close bookstores but licensing might be OK if procedural fairness and speed are guaranteed.

2.        RICO (Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) statute for seizing bookstore assets was added to law in 1984 to include obscenity.

a.     Assets can’t be seized prior to a court finding of obscenity

b.     But in Alexander v U.S. (1993) by 5-4 vote, the USSC permitted seizure and destruction of all store inventory including material found NOT obscene.

II.  National Security

1.        Pentagon papers - NYT v US (1971) SCOTUS said the federal government didn't meet burden of proof in the face of Free Speech as the preferred freedom (meaning the burden of proof shifts to the government). But for 15 days the NYT was restrained.

2.        The Progressive v US (1979)  A preliminary injunction is issued under Near (the judge “balanced the potential harms) but similar articles in other papers are published based on general information and government drops case.

3.        US v Marchetti (1972)  A Federal court prohibited publication of classified information because author had signed a secrecy contract.  The Court viewed it as a contract issue. SCOTUS denied an appeal.  This was extended in Snepp v US (1980) to permit  permanent injunctions on authors and allowed the government to keep profits from Snepp’s book ,even though no classified information was published (due to his contractual obligation to allow government review).

 

III.  Duty to Obey
 

A.       One can disobey statutes "Invalid on their Face"  like licensing for literature distribution of any kind (i.e. laws which restrain protected speech.)

B.       One must go to court first to overturn "valid laws administered in an unconstitutional way."  (e.g. discriminatory administration).

C.      One must obey court orders until they are overturned.